| Idea | Pilot | Policy Paper | Legislation | Implementation | Evaluation | Change | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Implemented in this survey? |
The government is seeking to reform the way in which hospital consultants (i.e. senior doctors) are paid.
An additional £240 million was to be made available for payments to consultants through an offer of increases in final salaries and additional payments for on-call commitments. Negotiations
between the Department of Health and the doctors' representative body - the British Medical association - took place in 2001 and an agreement was reached in June 2002. However, in a vote of the BMA
consultant membership that took place in September 2002, the deal was rejected by a proportion of two-to-one. In the light of this rejection, on 23 January 2003, the Secretary of State announced a
new package of rewards for consultants which it is intended to introduce in April 2003 after short consultation with representative organisations. The package will devolve responsibility for
negotiated contracts with consultants to individual NHS trusts (hospitals). If the full contract is not devolved, individual trusts will still be able to introduce incentive payments. They also be
able to invest in a new system of clinical excellence awards. There will also be new standards for job planning and a 'Code of Conduct' setting clear standards and defining best practice in managing
the relationship between NHS and private practice.
General practitioners work for the NHS on an independent contractor basis. The terms and conditions of their employment are set out in a national contract agreed between the Department of Health and
the doctors' representatives at the British Medical Association. The NHS Plan set out a commitment to a new contractual framework and in 2001, 86 per cent of GPs threatened to resign if a new
contract was not introduced quickly. A new contract has now been agreed and, at the time of writing, is about to be put to the BMA's GP membership for their approval. Balloting is due to be completed
by 11 April 2003. New features of the contract are: funding that is practice based according to the needs of patients; workload control which allows doctors to choose whether they will offer
out-of-hours services; and a wide range of payments that are linked to the achievement of quality standards.
This objective was set out in general terms in the NHS Plan. The main aims are to make consultant's more accountable for the way in which they use their time in the NHS and to increase their commitment to the NHS (at the expense of private work undertaken as part of established dual practice arrangements).
General Practioners
| Degree of Innovation | traditional |
|
innovative |
| Degree of Controversy | consensual |
|
highly controversial |
| Structural or Systemic Impact | marginal |
|
fundamental |
| Public Visibility | very low |
|
very high |
| Transferability | strongly system-dependent |
|
system-neutral |
| Idea | Pilot | Policy Paper | Legislation | Implementation | Evaluation | Change | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Implemented in this survey? |
The House of Commons Select Committee on Health summarised many of the concerns about conditions and payment of NHS consultants in their Third Report on Consultants' Contracts (2000). The
shortcomings they identified included; the lack of accurate and independently recorded data on the number of hours worked by consultants in the NHS and on private practice; the failure of many trusts
to adopt clearly specified job plans and contractually binding appraisal systems; lack of clarity over contractual obligations to working on fixed sessions, i.e. operating theatre sessions and
out-patient clinics; and a number of inefficiencies and inequities associated with consultants carrying out private practice.
The Select Committee made a number of recommendations designed to address these failings. A number of these, plus some additional proposals, were incorporated in the NHS Plan. These formed the basis
for the new contract offered to consultants. This included proposals for tighter enforcement of contractual obligations (e.g. clearer job plans and performance review) together with financial
incentives and regulatory restrictions designed to increase consultants' commitment to the NHS at the expense of private work. The government is anxious to maximise consultants commitment to the NHS
in order to meet the ambitious activity targets set out in the NHS Plan.
Modern reforms of GP payment arrangements date from the changes included in Promoting Better Health (Department of Health and Social Security, 1987). These were designed to make payments more
performance-related. Capitation payments accounted for about 60 per cent of GP income but a range of payments for achieving targets in terms of vaccinations, immunisations, cervical screening, etc.,
were also introduced. Throughout the 1990s, contractual changes strengthened this trend. The latest contract continues the trend but also addresses new concerns about the quality of care and GP
workloads at a time when the professional is experiencing major recruitment problems.
The approach of the idea is described as:
new:
The main stakeholders in this area are the government (as paymaster), the doctors' professional organisation (the British Medical Association) and individual doctors who have voting rights. The
consultants' contract represents an attempt to manage a profession that traditionally values its independence and autonomy. It represents a clash of cultures between those who believe that
professionals will discharge their obligations as professionals and those who believe that tighter management and individual incentives are necessary. The conflict between NHS work and private work
is a perennial problem in the NHS, with consultants anxious to maintain their right to engage in private work and the government anxious to restrict this activity. As explained above, consultants
have rejected the 2002 contract. Alternative proposals revolving around devolved contracting by individual hospitals with their consultants have been announce, meanwhile discussions are currently
taking place within the Department of Health about possible payments systems that could address this tension more effectively.
The GPs contract does not pose such a polarised position as that of GPs because GPs are formally independent contractors. However, the same desire to manage them more effectively within the NHS
applies. In fact, many GPs seem willing to forfeit their autonomy (e.g. become salaried professionals) in return for reductions in workload and calls (particulary out-of-hours calls) on their
time.
Not applicable.
Many of these issues are discussed above. To these could be added, a government stance that appears to be willing to impose conditions on doctors if agreement cannot be reached.
Not really applicable although the question does raise the obvious desirability of assessing doctors' performance under different payment regimes. This has not to date been done in the UK.
The crucial question that needs to be addressed here is the way in which doctors are motivated. In particular, are the performance assessment and performance related payments methods - that have been introduced as part of the adoption of the new public management approach - driving out the professional ethos that governs much professional behaviour?